

Secure Multiantenna Cognitive Wiretap Networks

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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a multiantenna cognitive wiretap network, where the secondary transmitter (Alice) communicates with the secondary receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). Specifically, we consider both half-duplex (HD) and full-duplex (FD) operations. For the HD, maximal-ratio combining (MRC) is adopted at Bob, while for the FD, we propose two jamming schemes to deteriorate the quality of the eavesdropper's channel, i.e., selection combining/selection jammer (SC/SJ) and SC/zero forcing beamforming (SC/ZFB). Assuming Rayleigh fading, exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of the cognitive wiretap network are derived. In addition, we also provide simple asymptotic approximations for the secrecy outage probability under two distinct scenarios, depending on the quality of the main and wiretap channels. From the analytical results and numerical simulations, it is concluded that all the proposed schemes outperform the SC scheme; all the proposed schemes achieve full diversity when the main channel is much better than the eavesdropper's channel; MRC outperforms SC/SJ and SC/ZFB in the low interference threshold regime, while the opposite holds in the high interference one; and SC/ZFB always achieves better performance than SC/SJ, albeit with higher complexity.

Index Terms—Cognitive radio, full duplex (FD), multiple antennas, physical layer security.

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I. INTRODUCTION

COGNITIVE radio, which is an effective framework to alleviate the spectrum shortage problem, has received considerable interests from the research community in recent years [1]–[3]. In spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks (CRNs), secondary users (SUs) are allowed to access the licensed spectrum as long as the interference on the primary user (PU) does not exceed the *interference temperature limit*. Extensive research efforts were made to investigate the information theoretic performance of spectrum sharing CRNs, such as outage probability [3], symbol error rate [4], and ergodic capacity [5]. To implement CRNs in practice, a number of challenging issues, including security, need to be addressed. Due to the open and dynamic features, CRNs are vulnerable to various malicious attacks, making secure communications to be a difficult task. In parallel, a physical layer security technique has emerged as a promising solution to provide perfect secrecy for data transmission [6]. Motivated by this, several works have investigated the security issues of CRNs from a physical layer perspective. In [7], Pei *et al.* designed a robust transmitter for secure transmission in CRNs. In [8], different relay selection schemes were proposed to enhance the security of CRNs, where the best relay was selected taking into account both the peak interference power constraint at PU and the maximal transmit power constraint at SU. In [9], the secure transmission of CRNs with the untrusted SUs was investigated and closed-form expressions for the achievable secrecy rate were presented.

For further secrecy enhancement, various techniques have been proposed, for instance, the multiantenna and full-duplex (FD) transmission. The secrecy performance of multiantenna assisted wiretap channels has been extensively studied in literature, covering diverse scenarios such as secrecy outage performance of single-input multi-output (SIMO) wiretap channels with selection combining (SC) scheme at the legitimate receiver [10], the impact of multiple eavesdroppers [11], the transmit antenna selection for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels with different receiver combining schemes [12]–[14] and the effect of antenna correlation on the secrecy outage performance [15]. In addition, the idea of employing the FD technique to improve the security by sending a jamming signal to degrade the quality of eavesdropper's channel was analyzed in [16]. Later, in [17], a cooperative secrecy transmission scheme in noncognitive wiretap network has been investigated, where a FD Bob not only receives the signal from Alice but sends a jamming signal at the same time as well. However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, no works have considered the application of FD operation in CRNs with multiple antennas for secrecy improvement.

Motivated by the above, we consider a multiantenna CRNs, where a secondary transmitter (Alice) communicates with a secondary destination (Bob), equipped with multiple antennas in the presence of a primary receiver (PR) and an eavesdropper (Eve). Both half-duplex (HD) and FD operations are assumed at Bob, respectively. Specifically, for the HD operation, the Bob employs maximal-ratio combining (MRC) to strengthen the signal detection, while for the FD operation, two different secure transmission schemes are proposed: 1) SC/selection jammer (SC/SJ) scheme, where the Bob first selects the best antenna to recover the data from the Alice, and then utilizes one of the remaining antennas to transmit the jamming signal at the same time, 2) SC/zero-forcing beamforming (SC/ZFB) scheme, where the Bob also selects the best antenna to recover the data from the Alice and use all the remaining antennas to send the jamming signal according to the principle of ZFB. It is worth noting that, in [10], the secrecy outage performance of multiantenna CRNs with an SC scheme has been investigated. However, it neglected the effect of correlation due to the interference link between Alice and PR on the secrecy performance. In addition, only HD operation was considered. Different from [10], this paper considers a more general system model taking into account this correlation. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.

- 1) We first derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna cognitive radio HD networks with MRC, which provides an efficient means to evaluate the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy performance of cognitive wiretap channels. To gain more insights, we present an asymptotic secrecy diversity analysis in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime under two scenarios: Scenario I—The legitimate receiver is located close to the transmitter. Scenario II—The legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are both located close to the transmitter. Based on the analytical results, we find that the secrecy diversity order is significantly affected by the distance between the Alice and the eavesdropper.
- 2) We derive new closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna cognitive radio FD networks with the operation of FD at Bob, under two different transmission schemes, i.e., SC/SJ and SC/ZFB. Moreover, for both schemes, the asymptotic secrecy diversity gain is investigated, which reveals that both SC/SJ and SC/ZFB can achieve full secrecy diversity under Scenario I and zero secrecy diversity under Scenario II.
- 3) The results demonstrate the intuition that increasing the number of antennas improves the secrecy performance of all the proposed schemes. Moreover, MRC tends to outperform SC/SJ and SC/ZFB when the constraint of the interference threshold at PR is stringent. However, when the interference temperature constraint becomes loose, both SC/SJ and SC/ZFB achieve better performance than MRC, and they gradually approach the performance of conventional noncognitive wiretap networks, i.e., no interference temperature constraint scenario. In addition, the secrecy performance of SC/ZFB is superior to that of SC/SJ, and the performance gap becomes large with the increase of antenna numbers at Bob.




Fig. 1. System model.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is introduced in Section II. Section III formulates the problem and presents a set of new analytical expressions for the secrecy outage performance. In Section IV, we provide a high SNR analysis for the secrecy outage probability. Section V presents the numerical results and discussions. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and summarizes the key findings.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

Let us consider a multiantenna cognitive wiretap channel, as shown in Fig. 1, which consists of a secondary transmitter (Alice), a secondary receiver (Bob), a primary receiver (PR), and an eavesdropper (Eve). Similar to [10] and [18], the considered scenario can be regarded as an uplink network, where all users are equipped with a single antenna, except that base station (BS), i.e., Bob, has N_B antennas. Throughout this paper, the following assumptions are adopted.

- 1) Similar to [3], [10], and [19], we assume that the primary transmitter is far away from the secondary receiver; thus, the interference from the primary transmitter can be ignored at the secondary receivers, i.e., Bob and Eve.
- 2) Without loss of generality, the main and wiretap channels are assumed to be quasi-static independent and nonidentical fading channels, following the Rayleigh distribution. The corresponding channel power gain between the nodes K and T is denoted as $|h_{KT}|^2$, which is an exponentially distributed random variable (RV) with variance λ_{KT} .
- 3) Similar to [17], [20], and [21], all channel state information (CSI) is known at Bob, i.e., the CSI of Eve to Bob link¹ and the CSI of Alice to Bob link.

To exploit the advantages of multiple antennas, we consider three different secure transmission schemes, i.e., MRC with HD operation, SC/SJ with FD operation, and SC/ZFB with FD operation. For MRC with HD scenario, Bob adopts the MRC to strengthen the signal detection, and thus, the instantaneous

¹This case is applicable in the multicast and unicast networks where the users play dual roles as legitimate ones for transmitting and receiving nonconfidential information and eavesdroppers for other confidential information [17], [22].

SNR between Alice and Bob is given by

$$\gamma_{B_1} = \frac{P_{S_1}}{\sigma^2} \|\mathbf{h}_{AB}\|^2 \quad (1)$$

where \mathbf{h}_{AB} is an $N_B \times 1$ channel link vector between Alice and Bob, σ^2 denotes the noise variance at each receiver, and P_{S_1} is the transmit power of Alice, which must satisfy [3]

$$P_{S_1} = \min \left(\frac{Q}{|h_{AP}|^2}, P_t \right) \quad (2)$$

where P_t is the maximum transmit power constraint at Alice and Q denotes the interference temperature constraint at the PU. In addition, h_{AP} is the channel coefficient between Alice and PR, which can be obtained through a spectrum-band manager that mediates between the licensed and unlicensed users [23].

Similarly, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper's channel is given by

$$\gamma_{E_1} = \frac{P_{S_1}}{\sigma^2} |h_{AE}|^2 \quad (3)$$

where h_{AE} represents the channel coefficient between Alice and Eve.

For SC/SJ with FD operation, Bob first selects the best antenna based on the CSI of the main channel, and utilizes the best antenna in the remaining $N_B - 1$ antennas to send the jamming signal, based on the channel between Bob and Eve, in which only one of the antennas at Bob is selected to send the jamming not all antennas due to the lower computational load of implementation. Hence, the instantaneous SNR at Bob and the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at Eve, when SC/SJ is assumed, are, respectively, given by²

$$\gamma_{B_2} = \frac{P_{S_2}}{\sigma^2} \max_{1 \leq i \leq N_B} (|h_{ABi}|^2) \quad (4)$$

and

$$\gamma_{E_2} = \frac{P_{S_2} |h_{AE}|^2}{P_B \max_{1 \leq j \leq N_B - 1} (|h_{BjE}|^2) + \sigma^2} \quad (5)$$

where h_{ABi} denotes the channel coefficient between Alice and the i th antenna of Bob, and h_{BjE} is the channel coefficient between the j th antenna of Bob and the Eve. Please note that, in order to meet the interference temperature constraint, the aggregate interference power at PR from Alice and Bob should satisfy the following inequality:

$$P_{S_2} |h_{AP}|^2 + P_B |h_{Bj^*P}|^2 \leq Q \quad (6)$$

where j^* is the index of the selected antenna in the remaining $N_B - 1$ antennas, and h_{Bj^*P} is the channel coefficient between the selected antenna of Bob and PR, which can also be obtained through a spectrum-band manager, as in [23]. In order to make

²Note that for the FD mechanism, we assume that the self-interference can be completely suppressed at Bob. As in [17] and [24]–[29], this assumption is widely used to study the information theoretic oriented performance, i.e., outage probability and capacity. Although full cancellation of self-interference cannot be achieved even with the help of state-of-the-art techniques in [30].

the analysis tractable, we assume that the transmit powers of P_{S_2} and P_B are equal.³ Therefore

$$P_{S_2} = \min \left(\frac{Q}{|h_{AP}|^2 + |h_{Bj^*P}|^2}, P_t \right) \quad (7)$$

and

$$P_B = \min \left(\frac{Q}{|h_{AP}|^2 + |h_{Bj^*P}|^2}, P_t \right). \quad (8)$$

For SC/ZFB based on FD operation, Bob first selects the best antenna based on the CSI of the main channel, and utilizes the remaining $N_B - 1$ antennas to send a weighted jamming signal. To satisfy the interference constraint at PR, we adopt the ZFB algorithm to avoid the undesirable jamming signals at PR. Thus, the optimal weight vector \mathbf{w}_{ZF} is the solution of the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\mathbf{w}_{ZF}} \left| \mathbf{h}_{BE}^\dagger \mathbf{w}_{ZF} \right| \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad \left| \mathbf{h}_{BP}^\dagger \mathbf{w}_{ZF} \right| = 0 \ \& \ \|\mathbf{w}_{ZF}\|_F = 1 \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

where \dagger is the conjugate transpose operator and $\|\cdot\|_F$ denotes the Frobenius norm, \mathbf{h}_{BE} and \mathbf{h}_{BP} denote the $(N_B - 1) \times 1$ channel vectors between the remaining $N_B - 1$ antennas of the Bob and the Eve, and the remaining $N_B - 1$ antennas of the Bob and the PR, respectively. Now, using the projection matrix theory [31], the optimal weight vector can be obtained as

$$\mathbf{w}_{ZF} = \frac{\mathbf{T}^\perp \mathbf{h}_{BE}}{\|\mathbf{T}^\perp \mathbf{h}_{BE}\|} \quad (10)$$

where $\mathbf{T}^\perp = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{h}_{BP} (\mathbf{h}_{BP}^\dagger \mathbf{h}_{BP})^{-1} \mathbf{h}_{BP}^\dagger)$ is the projection idempotent matrix with rank $N_B - 2$. As a result, the instantaneous SNR of the main and the instantaneous SINR of the wiretap channels, respectively, can be expressed as

$$\gamma_{B_3} = \frac{P_{S_3}}{\sigma^2} \max_{1 \leq i \leq N_B} (|h_{ABi}|^2) \quad (11)$$

and

$$\gamma_{E_3} = \frac{P_{S_3} |h_{AE}|^2}{P_Z \left| \mathbf{h}_{BE}^\dagger \mathbf{w}_{ZF} \right|^2 + \sigma^2} \quad (12)$$

where the transmit power of Alice P_{S_3} is the same in (2), and P_Z denotes the power of the jamming signal from Bob. Notice that different from P_B , the jamming power P_Z will not be affected by the interference threshold Q ; hence, it can take the maximum transmit power constraint in practice to maximize the secrecy performance.

As mentioned in [32], the achievable secrecy rate of the multiantenna cognitive wiretap channels is given by

$$C_S = \begin{cases} C_{B_i} - C_{E_i}, & \gamma_{B_i} > \gamma_{E_i} \\ 0, & \gamma_{B_i} \leq \gamma_{E_i} \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

³Since the main purpose of this work is to investigate the impact of HD and FD mechanism on the secrecy performance of multiantenna cognitive wiretap channels, it suffices to consider the equal power scenario. For the general distinct P_{S_2} and P_B scenario, we leave it as a future work.

where $i = \{1, 2, 3\}$ represents MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB, respectively, $C_{B_i} = \log_2(1 + \gamma_{B_i})$ and $C_{E_i} = \log_2(1 + \gamma_{E_i})$ are the achievable instantaneous rates at Bob and Eve, respectively.

For the reader's convenience, we define $\rho = \frac{Q}{P_i}$, $\bar{\gamma}_B = \frac{P_i}{\sigma^2} \lambda_{AB} = \frac{Q}{\rho \sigma^2} \lambda_{AB}$, $\bar{\gamma}_E = \frac{P_i}{\sigma^2} \lambda_{AE} = \frac{Q}{\rho \sigma^2} \lambda_{AE}$, $\bar{\gamma}_J = \frac{P_i}{\sigma^2} \lambda_{BE} = \frac{Q}{\rho \sigma^2} \lambda_{BE}$, and $\bar{\gamma}_Z = \frac{P_i}{\sigma^2} \lambda_{BE}$.

III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section, we investigate the secrecy outage performance of the cognitive wiretap systems with the proposed secure transmission schemes. In [33], the secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability of the secrecy capacity, C_S , being lower than a predetermined threshold, R_S . Mathematically, it can be represented as [33]

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}(R_S) &= \Pr(C_S < R_S) \\ &= \int_0^\infty F_{\gamma_{B_i}}(2^{R_S}(1+x)-1) f_{\gamma_{E_i}}(x) dx. \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Next, we present a detail analysis for the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna cognitive wiretap channels with the MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB, respectively.

A. MRC Scheme

The key challenge in the analysis lies in the fact that γ_{B_1} and γ_{E_1} are statistically dependent due to the presence of the common RV, $G_1 = |h_{AP}|^2$, in P_{S_1} . To tackle this problem, we adopt the condition-and-average approach. Specifically, we first seek the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the SNR of the main channel and the probability density function (PDF) of the SNR of the eavesdropper's channel conditioned on the RV G_1 , respectively.

According to (1) and with the help of [34], the conditional CDF of γ_{B_1} is given by

$$F_{\gamma_{B_1}}(x|G_1) = 1 - e^{-\frac{\sigma^2 x}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{AB}}} \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \frac{1}{k!} \left(\frac{\sigma^2 x}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{AB}} \right)^k. \quad (15)$$

Similarly, based on (2), the conditional PDF of γ_{E_1} can be expressed as

$$f_{\gamma_{E_1}}(y|G_1) = \frac{\sigma^2}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{AE}} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{AE}}\right). \quad (16)$$

Lemma 1: The secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs employing MRC with HD operation is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_S) &= \left[1 - \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \frac{1}{k!} \frac{1}{(\bar{\gamma}_B)^k} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_S}-1}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. \times \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{k}{i} (2^{R_S}-1)^{k-i} (2^{R_S})^i i! \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{i+1} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right) \right] + \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right) - \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \frac{1}{k! (\rho \bar{\gamma}_B)^k \rho \bar{\gamma}_E} \\ &\times \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{k}{i} (2^{R_S}-1)^{k-i} (2^{R_S})^i \left(\frac{\rho \bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{i+1} \frac{i!}{\lambda_{AP}} \\ &\times \left(\frac{\rho \bar{\gamma}_B \lambda_{AP}}{(2^{R_S}-1) \lambda_{AP} + \rho \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{k-i+1} \Gamma\left(k-i+1, \frac{(2^{R_S}-1) \lambda_{AP} + \rho \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \lambda_{AP}}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

where $\Gamma(\cdot, \cdot)$ is the incomplete gamma function [35, eq. (8.350.2)].

Proof: See Appendix A.

B. SC/SJ Scheme

Similar to MRC, γ_{B_2} and γ_{E_2} are statistically dependent due to the existence of the common RV $G_2 = |h_{AP}|^2 + |h_{B_j^*P}|^2$. As such, we first seek the conditional CDF of γ_{B_2} and the conditional PDF of γ_{E_2} .

Utilizing (4) and after some algebraic manipulations, the conditional CDF of γ_{B_2} can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} F_{\gamma_{B_2}}(x|G_2) &= \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 x}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}}\right) \right]^{N_B} \\ &= 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n x}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Lemma 2: The PDF of γ_{E_2} conditioned on the RV G_2 is given by

$$\begin{aligned} f_{\gamma_{E_2}}(y|G_2) &= \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE}}\right) \\ &\times \frac{m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} P_B \lambda_{JE}}{(m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} + P_B \lambda_{JE} y)^2} + \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} \\ &\times \frac{(-1)^{m-1} m \sigma^2}{m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} + P_B \lambda_{JE} y} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE}}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Proof: See Appendix B. ■

Armed with (18) and (19), we now give the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs using the SC/SJ scheme with the FD mechanism in the following lemma.

Lemma 3: The secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs using SC/SJ with FD is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_S) &= 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} I_1 \\ &\quad - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} I_2 \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_1 = & \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) - \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] \\
 & \times \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s} - 1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \left[1 + \frac{n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_E} \right. \\
 & \times \exp\left(\frac{(n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B) m}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \text{Ei}\left(-\frac{(n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B) m}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \\
 & + \sum_{k=0}^1 \frac{(b\rho)^{2-k} \rho^k c}{(\lambda_{\text{AP}})^2} \left[\sum_{i=0}^{1-k} \binom{1+i}{i} \mu^{2+i} \left(\frac{1}{a}\right)^{1-k-i} \Psi\left(1, k+i; \frac{a}{b}\right) \right. \\
 & \left. + \sum_{j=0}^1 \binom{1-k+j}{j} (-1)^{2-k} \nu^{2-k+j} \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^{1-j} \Psi\left(1, j; \frac{c}{b}\right) \right] \quad (21)
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_2 = & \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) - \frac{\rho \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right)}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \right] \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s} - 1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \\
 & \times \left[-\frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \exp\left(\frac{(n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B) m}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \text{Ei}\left(-\frac{(n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B) m}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \right. \\
 & + \exp\left(\frac{a}{b}\right) \frac{m}{\rho \bar{\gamma}_J} \sum_{k=0}^2 \frac{2}{k!} \frac{(b\rho)^{3-k} \rho^k}{(\lambda_{\text{AP}})^2} \left[(-\nu)^{3-k} \Psi\left(1, 1; \frac{c}{b}\right) \right. \\
 & \left. + \sum_{t=0}^{2-k} (-1) \mu^{1+t} \left(\frac{1}{a}\right)^{2-k-t} \Psi\left(1, k+t-1; \frac{a}{b}\right) \right] \quad (22)
 \end{aligned}$$

with $\text{Ei}(\cdot)$ being the exponential integral function [35, eq. (8.211.1)] and $\Psi(\cdot, \cdot; \cdot)$ being the confluent hypergeometric function of the second kind [35, eq. (9.211.4)], respectively.

Proof: See Appendix C. \blacksquare

C. SC/ZFB Scheme

Similar to MRC, in this case, γ_{B_3} and γ_{E_3} are not statistically independent due to the presence of the common RV $G_1 = |h_{\text{AP}}|^2$ in P_{S_3} . Hence, we first give the conditional CDF of γ_{B_3} and the conditional PDF of γ_{E_3} , and we have

$$F_{\gamma_{B_3}}(x|G_1) = 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n x}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right). \quad (23)$$

In the following lemma, we derive the conditional PDF of γ_{E_3} .

Lemma 4: The PDF of γ_{E_3} conditioned on the RV G_1 is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 f_{\gamma_{E_3}}(y|G_1) = & \frac{\sigma^2}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right) \\
 & \times \left(\frac{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}{P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}} y + P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}} \right)^{N_B - 2}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & + \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right) \\
 & \times \frac{(N_B - 2) P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}} (P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}})^{N_B - 2}}{(P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}} y + P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}})^{N_B - 1}}. \quad (24)
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof: See Appendix D. \blacksquare

To this end, according to (23) and (24), we can present the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs using SC/ZFB with FD operation in the following key lemma.

Lemma 5: The secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs using SC/ZBF with FD operation can be given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/ZFB}}(R_s) = & 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s} - 1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \\
 & \times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] \left[\frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_Z} \Psi\left(1, 4 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right) \right. \\
 & + (N_B - 2) \Psi\left(1, 3 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right) \\
 & \left. - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \frac{\rho \bar{\gamma}_B \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s} - 1) \lambda_{\text{AP}} + \rho \bar{\gamma}_B}{\lambda_{\text{AP}} \bar{\gamma}_B}\right)}{n(2^{R_s} - 1) \lambda_{\text{AP}} + \rho \bar{\gamma}_B} \right. \\
 & \times \left[\frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_Z} \Psi\left(1, 4 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right) \right. \\
 & \left. + (N_B - 2) \Psi\left(1, 3 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right) \right]. \quad (25)
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof: See Appendix E. \blacksquare

In lemmas 1, 3, and 5, closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of multiantenna CRNs are presented, which provide an efficient means to evaluate the impact of different system parameters on the secrecy performance of multiantenna cognitive wiretap channels. However, the derived expressions are in general complicated to gain more insights. Hence, in the following, we look into the high SNR regime and analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage probability.

IV. HIGH SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO ANALYSIS

In this section, we focus on the asymptotic high SNR analysis. Specifically, two separate scenarios are studied: 1) $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and fixed $\bar{\gamma}_E$, which is a scenario where the main channel quality is much better than the eavesdropper's channel, i.e., when the eavesdropper is located far away from Alice, or the eavesdropper's channel is severely blocked due to heavy shadowing. 2) $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$, which is a scenario where both the main channel and eavesdropper's channel experience similar fading conditions.

A. Scenario I: $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and Fixed $\bar{\gamma}_E$

1) MRC Scheme:

Corollary 1: The secrecy outage probability for MRC under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and fixed $\bar{\gamma}_E$ can be approximated as

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_s) \approx \Delta_{\text{MRC}} \bar{\gamma}_B^{-N_B} \quad (26)$$

where Δ_{MRC} is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{MRC}} &= \frac{2^{N_B R_s}}{N_B! \bar{\gamma}_E} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} q! \bar{\gamma}_E^{q+1} \\ &\times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] + \left(\frac{2^{R_s}}{\rho} \right)^{N_B} \frac{1}{N_B! \bar{\gamma}_E} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \\ &\times \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} q! \bar{\gamma}_E^{q+1} \left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \right)^{-N_B} \Gamma\left(N_B + 1, \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

Proof: See Appendix F. ■

2) SC/SJ Scheme:

Corollary 2: The secrecy outage probability for SC/SJ under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and fixed $\bar{\gamma}_E$ can be approximated as

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_s) \approx \Delta_{\text{SC/SJ}} \bar{\gamma}_B^{-N_B} \quad (28)$$

where $\Delta_{\text{SC/SJ}}$ is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{SC/SJ}} &= 2^{N_B R_s} (\Theta_1 + \Theta_2) \\ &\times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) - \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] \\ &+ \left(\frac{2^{R_s}}{\rho} \right)^{N_B} (\Theta_1 + \Theta_2) \left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \right)^{-N_B} \Gamma\left(N_B + 2, \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \Theta_1 &= \sum_{m=1}^{N_B - 1} \binom{N_B - 1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} \\ &\times \left(\frac{m \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^q \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, q; \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \Theta_2 &= \sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B - 1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} \\ &\times \left(\frac{m \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^{q+1} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, q+1; \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

Proof: See Appendix G. ■

3) SC/ZFB Scheme:

Corollary 3: The secrecy outage probability for SC/ZFB under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and fixed $\bar{\gamma}_E$ can be approximated as

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/ZFB}}(R_s) \approx \Delta_{\text{SC/ZFB}} \bar{\gamma}_B^{-N_B} \quad (32)$$

where $\Delta_{\text{SC/ZFB}}$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\text{SC/ZFB}} &= 2^{N_B R_s} (\Lambda_1 + \Lambda_2) \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] \\ &+ \left(\frac{2^{R_s}}{\rho} \right)^{N_B} (\Lambda_1 + \Lambda_2) \left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}} \right)^{-N_B} \Gamma\left(N_B + 1, \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda_1 &= \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^{q+1} \\ &\times \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, 4+q-N_B; \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda_2 &= \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s} - 1}{2^{R_s}} \right)^{N_B - q} \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^q (N_B - 2) \\ &\times \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, 3+q-N_B; \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

Proof: Following a similar procedure as in the proof of Corollary 2, the desired result can be obtained. ■

From the above corollaries, we have the following key remark:

Remark: The MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB achieve the same secrecy diversity, $G_d = N_B$, under Scenario I, which is independent of the quality of the eavesdropper's channel and the primary networks. However, the parameters of the eavesdropper's channel and the primary networks affect the secrecy performance through the coding gain, i.e.,

$$G_c = (\Delta_\star)^{-\frac{1}{N_B}} \quad (36)$$

where $\star \in \{\text{MRC}, \text{SC/SJ}, \text{SC/ZFB}\}$.

B. Scenario II: $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$

We now turn our attention to analyze the approximative secrecy outage probability of multiantenna cognitive wiretap channels under Scenario II.

1) MRC Scheme:

Corollary 4: The approximative secrecy outage probability for MRC under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_s) &\approx \left[1 - \sum_{k=0}^{N_B - 1} \frac{(2^{R_s})^k}{(\bar{\gamma}_B)^k \bar{\gamma}_E} \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{k+1} \right] \\ &\times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \right] + \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right) \\ &- \sum_{k=0}^{N_B - 1} \frac{1}{(\bar{\gamma}_B)^k \bar{\gamma}_E} (2^{R_s})^k \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_s} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{k+1} \Gamma\left(1, \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{\text{AP}}}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$



Proof: Based on (17), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability can be easily derived after some mathematical manipulations. ■

2) SC/SJ Scheme:

Corollary 5: The approximative secrecy outage probability for SC/SJ under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$ is given by

TABLE I
 COMPARISON OF THE MRC, SC/SJ, AND SC/ZFB SCHEMES

	MRC	SC/SJ	SC/ZFB
CSI requirement	\mathbf{h}_{AB} and h_{AP}	$h_{AB_i}, h_{AP}, h_{B_{jE}}$ and $h_{B_{j^*P}}$	$h_{AB_i}, h_{AP}, \mathbf{h}_{BE}$ and \mathbf{h}_{BP}
Antenna number N_B requirement	None	$N_B \geq 2$	$N_B \geq 3$
Diversity order	$N_B/0$	$N_B/0$	$N_B/0$
Impact of SU destination antenna	G_d and G_e /only G_e	G_d and G_e /only G_e	G_d and G_e /only G_e


 Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability of the system with the MRC scheme for different interference thresholds Q when $N_B = 3$ and $N_B = 5$, respectively.

 Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability of the system with SC/SJ scheme for different interference threshold Q when $N_B = 3$ and $N_B = 5$, respectively.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_S) &\approx 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} \\
 &\times (-1)^{m-1} \Psi\left(1, 0; \frac{\bar{\gamma}_B + n2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J / m}\right) - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \\
 &\times \sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \Psi\left(1, 1; \frac{\bar{\gamma}_B + n2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J / m}\right). \quad (38)
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof: See Appendix H. ■

3) SC/ZFB Scheme:

Corollary 6: The approximative secrecy outage probability for SC/ZFB under $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/ZFB}}(R_S) &\approx 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_Z} \\
 &\times \Psi\left(1, 4 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right) - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \\
 &\times (N_B - 2) \Psi\left(1, 3 - N_B; \frac{n2^{R_S} \bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_Z}\right). \quad (39)
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof: Following a similar procedure as in the proof of Corollary 5, the above result can be easily obtained. ■

Remark: In contrast to Scenario I, all three schemes exhibit the secrecy outage floor when $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$, which indicates that no secrecy diversity can be obtained.

C. Comparison of the Proposed Schemes

We now provide a detailed comparison of the proposed three schemes. In the previous analysis, the CSI requirement to perform jamming or ZFB was not explicitly mentioned. In practice, the acquisition of CSI involves additional feedback overhead, which must be considered in the design of wireless systems. On the other hand, if a large amount of CSI is available, more sophisticated transmission schemes should be designed in order to improve the secrecy performance. Hence, to make a fair comparison among different schemes, the CSI requirement of each individual scheme must be characterized in Table I.

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

In this section, we present representative numerical results to verify the analytical ones, make a comprehensive comparison between our proposed schemes and the SC scheme, and give a detail investigation on the impact of different system parameters on the secrecy outage performance of multiantenna cognitive wiretap systems. Without loss of generality, we assume that the secrecy rate is $R_S = 2$, the noise variance is $\sigma^2 = 1$, and the SNR is $\frac{P_t}{\sigma^2}$. In addition, the average power of all the channel links is set to one. As shown in these figures, the analytical results are in exact agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results and the asymptotic curves remain sufficiently tight across the entire SNR range of interest, which validates the accuracy of the analytical expressions.

Figs. 2–4 illustrate the secrecy outage probability of the cognitive wiretap network with MRC, SC/SJ and SC/ZFB for a different number of antennas N_B and a different interference




Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability of the system with the SC/ZFB scheme for different interference thresholds Q when $N_B = 3$ and $N_B = 5$, respectively.




Fig. 5. Exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities for SC, MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB schemes under Scenario I when $N_B = 5$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E = 10$ dB.

thresholds Q , respectively. The secrecy outage probability of conventional noncognitive wiretap network without interference temperature constraint is also provided as a benchmark for comparison. It is evident from these figures that by increasing N_B , the secrecy outage probability can be significantly reduced for all three schemes. This is rather intuitive, since increasing N_B provides additional secrecy diversity or secrecy coding gain. We also observe that the secrecy outage probability of the cognitive wiretap network is inferior to that of the conventional noncognitive wiretap network, and the secrecy outage performance can be substantially improved when the interference threshold Q at the primary receiver is loose, i.e., for higher Q . In addition, the secrecy performance of SC/SJ and SC/ZFB is superior to MRC in conventional noncognitive wiretap networks since the jamming signal from the FD Bob can degrade the secrecy diversity of the eavesdropper.

Fig. 5 plots the secrecy outage probability versus SNR for the three proposed schemes and the SC scheme when Bob is located close to Alice. It is observed that all schemes achieve the same secrecy diversity order of N_B . Furthermore, we see that the SC/ZFB scheme always attains better performance than the MRC and SC/SJ schemes, while they all outperform the SC scheme, which indicates that using the MRC scheme at Bob or by transmitting jamming signals from a FD Bob will improve the secrecy array gain of the system compared to the SC scheme under Scenario I.




Fig. 6. Exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities for SC, MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB schemes under Scenario II when $N_B = 5$.




Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probabilities of SC, MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB schemes versus the number of antennas of Bob when $P_t = 10$ dB.

Fig. 6 presents the secrecy outage probabilities versus SNR for the three proposed schemes and the SC scheme when $N_B = 5$ and $\frac{\bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_E} = 10$ dB. As illustrated, the secrecy outage probability of all schemes settle in the high SNR regime, which confirms the analytical results under Scenario II. It is also observed that all the proposed schemes achieve better secrecy performance than the SC scheme. In addition, the MRC scheme outperforms the SC/SJ and SC/ZFB schemes at the low SNR regime, while the opposite holds in the high SNR regime.

Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the impact of antenna numbers N_B and the interference threshold Q on the secrecy outage performance of the SC, MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB schemes, respectively. It can be observed from both figures that the secrecy performance can be improved by increasing the number of antennas or the interference threshold. In addition, when the interference threshold becomes large, the secrecy performance gradually approach to that of the conventional noncognitive wiretap network without interference temperature constraint. Moreover, when the interference threshold is large, the SC/ZFB scheme always attains better performance than the SC/SJ scheme, and they both achieve better performance than the MRC scheme. This can be explained by the fact that a large Q implies loose constraint at the PR, thus, the transmit power of jamming signal can be made large. In addition, our proposed schemes achieve better performance than the SC scheme, especially when the number




Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probabilities of SC, MRC, SC/SJ, and SC/ZFB schemes versus the interference threshold Q when $N_B = 5$ and $P_t = 10$ dB.

of antennas is large or the interference threshold Q is large, which demonstrates the advantage of our proposed schemes.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy outage performance of multiantenna CRNs over Rayleigh fading channels. To exploit the advantages of the multiple antennas, we have proposed three secure transmission schemes with both HD and FD operations. Specifically, closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage probability of all schemes were derived. Moreover, simple and informative high SNR approximations for the secrecy outage probability were derived, which enables us to gain useful insights into the impact of key parameters on the secrecy performance. The results of this paper suggest that the full diversity, i.e., N_B , can be achieved when only quality of the main channel is much better than the eavesdropper's channel. However, when the main and the eavesdropper's channels experience similar fading conditions, the diversity reduces to zero. Moreover, MRC with HD operation outperforms SC/SJ and SC/ZFB with the FD operation at the low interference threshold regime, while the opposite holds in the high interference threshold regime. In addition, our proposed schemes tend to achieve better performance than SC scheme, which validate the efficiency of our proposed schemes.

APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1

Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) and performing some simple mathematical manipulations, the conditional secrecy outage probability can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_S|G_1) &= \int_0^\infty F_{\gamma_{B_1}}(2^{R_S}(1+y)-1|G_1) f_{\gamma_{E_1}}(y|G_1) dy \\
 &= 1 - \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \frac{1}{k!} \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{P_{S_1}\lambda_{AB}} \right)^k \frac{\sigma^2}{P_{S_1}\lambda_{AE}} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2(2^{R_S}-1)}{P_{S_1}\lambda_{AB}}\right) \\
 &\quad \times \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{k}{i} (2^{R_S}-1)^{k-i} (2^{R_S})^i i! \left(\frac{P_{S_1}\lambda_{AB}P_{S_1}\lambda_{AE}/\sigma^2}{2^{R_S}P_{S_1}\lambda_{AE}+P_{S_1}\lambda_{AB}} \right)^{i+1}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{40}$$

Then, averaging over G_1 , the unconditional secrecy outage probability can be computed as

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_S) &= \int_0^\infty P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_S|G_1) f_{G_1}(g) dg \\
 &= \int_0^{Q/P_t} \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{2^{R_S}-1}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{k}{i} \right. \\
 &\quad \times \left. \left(\frac{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_S}\bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{i+1} \frac{(2^{R_S}-1)^{k-i} (2^{R_S})^i i!}{(\bar{\gamma}_B)^k \bar{\gamma}_E k!} \right] f_{G_1}(g) dg \\
 &\quad + \int_{Q/P_t}^\infty \left[1 - \sum_{k=0}^{N_B-1} \sum_{i=0}^k \binom{k}{i} \frac{(2^{R_S}-1)^{k-i} (2^{R_S})^i i!}{\rho\bar{\gamma}_E(\rho\bar{\gamma}_B)^k k!} g^{k-i} \right. \\
 &\quad \times \left. \left(\frac{\rho\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_E}{2^{R_S}\bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{i+1} \exp\left(-\frac{g(2^{R_S}-1)}{\rho\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \right] f_{G_1}(g) dg.
 \end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

To this end, substituting the PDF of G_1 into (41) and utilizing the equality [35, eq. (3.381.4)], the desired result can be derived after some algebraic manipulations.

APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2

Let us define $Z = \frac{P_B}{\sigma^2} \max_{j \in N_B-1} (|h_{jE}|^2)$. Recall that the conditional CDF and PDF of Z are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_Z(z|G_2) &= \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 z}{P_B\lambda_{JE}}\right) \right]^{N_B-1} \\
 &= 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 m z}{P_B\lambda_{JE}}\right)
 \end{aligned} \tag{42}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 f_Z(z|G_2) &= \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \frac{\sigma^2 m}{P_B\lambda_{JE}} \\
 &\quad \times \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 m z}{P_B\lambda_{JE}}\right).
 \end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

Then, the conditional CDF of γ_{E_2} can be derived as

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_{\gamma_{E_2}}(y|G_2) &= \int_0^\infty F_{X_E}(y(z+1)|G_2) f_Z(z|G_2) dz \\
 &= 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \frac{\binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} m P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}\right)}{P_B\lambda_{JE}y + m P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}
 \end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

where $F_{X_E}(\cdot)$ is the CDF of $X_E = \frac{P_{S_2}|h_{AE}|^2}{\sigma^2}$ conditioned on the RV G_2 . To this end, taking the derivative of $F_{\gamma_{E_2}}(y|G_2)$ yields the conditional PDF of γ_{E_2} given in (19).

APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3

Similar to (40), we first present the conditional secrecy outage probability in (45), shown at the bottom of the page.

To derive the unconditional secrecy outage probability, we average over RV G_2 , which produces two double integrals as (46) and (47), shown at the bottom of the page.

Since the PDF of G_2 can be obtained as

$$f_{G_2}(g) = \left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{AP}}\right)^2 g \exp\left(-\frac{g}{\lambda_{AP}}\right). \quad (48)$$

Substituting (48) into I_5 and performing some simple mathematical manipulations, we have

$$\begin{aligned} I_5 &= \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \frac{m\bar{\gamma}_E\bar{\gamma}_J}{(\bar{\gamma}_J y + m\bar{\gamma}_E)^2} \\ &\times \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right) - \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}} \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right)\right] \\ &\times \exp\left(-\frac{y}{\bar{\gamma}_E}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{AP}}\right)^2 \exp\left(-\frac{y+a}{b}\right) \\ &\times \sum_{k=0}^1 \frac{(b\rho)^{2-k} (\rho)^k}{(y+a)^{2-k}} \frac{m\bar{\gamma}_E\bar{\gamma}_J}{(\bar{\gamma}_J y + m\bar{\gamma}_E)^2} \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

where $a = \frac{n(2^{R_s}-1)\bar{\gamma}_E\lambda_{AP} + \rho\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_E}{n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E\lambda_{AP} + \bar{\gamma}_B\lambda_{AP}}$ and $b = \frac{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_E\lambda_{AP}}{n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E\lambda_{AP} + \bar{\gamma}_B\lambda_{AP}}$.

Then, substituting (46) into (49), I_1 can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} I_1 &= \left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right) - \frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}} \exp\left(-\frac{\rho}{\lambda_{AP}}\right)\right] \\ &\times \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s}-1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \left[1 + \frac{n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B}{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_E}\right] \\ &\times \exp\left(\frac{(n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B)m}{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \text{Ei}\left(-\frac{(n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E + \bar{\gamma}_B)m}{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \\ &+ \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{\lambda_{AP}}\right)^2 \int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{y+a}{b}\right) \sum_{k=0}^1 \frac{(b\rho)^{2-k} (\rho)^k}{(y+a)^{2-k}} \frac{c}{(y+c)^2} dy}_{I_7} \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

where $c = m\bar{\gamma}_E/\bar{\gamma}_J$, and I_7 can be further simplified as

$$\begin{aligned} I_7 &= \sum_{k=0}^1 (b\rho)^{2-k} \rho^k c \\ &\times \int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{y+a}{b}\right) \left[\sum_{i=0}^{1-k} \frac{\binom{1+i}{i} \mu^{2+i}}{(y+a)^{2-k-i}} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \sum_{j=0}^1 \frac{\binom{1-k+j}{j} (-1)^{2-k} \nu^{2-k+j}}{(y+c)^{2-j}} \right] dy \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_s|G_2) &= \int_0^\infty F_{\gamma_{B_2}}(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1|G_2) f_{\gamma_{E_2}}(y|G_2) dy \\ &= 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \\ &\times \underbrace{\int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}P_B\lambda_{JE}}{(mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE} + P_B\lambda_{JE}y)^2} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}\right) dy}_{I_3} \\ &- \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \\ &\times \underbrace{\int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{\sigma^2 m \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}\right)}{mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE} + P_B\lambda_{JE}y} dy}_{I_4}. \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

$$I_1 = \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty \underbrace{\exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}P_B\lambda_{JE}}{(mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE} + P_B\lambda_{JE}y)^2} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}\right)}_{I_5} f_{G_2}(g) dg dy. \quad (46)$$

$$I_2 = \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty \underbrace{\exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{\sigma^2 m}{mP_{S_2}\lambda_{AE} + P_B\lambda_{JE}y} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2}\lambda_{AE}}\right)}_{I_6} f_{G_2}(g) dg dy. \quad (47)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \sum_{k=0}^1 (b\rho)^{2-k} \rho^k c \left[\sum_{i=0}^{1-k} \binom{1+i}{i} \mu^{2+i} \left(\frac{1}{a}\right)^{1-k-i} \Psi\left(1, k+i; \frac{a}{b}\right) \right. \\
 &\quad \left. + \sum_{j=0}^1 \binom{1-k+j}{j} (-1)^{2-k} \nu^{2-k+j} \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^{1-j} \Psi\left(1, j; \frac{c}{b}\right) \right] \quad (51)
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\mu = \frac{1}{a-c}$, and $\nu = \frac{1}{c-a}$.

To this end, substituting (51) into (50), we obtain I_1 as in (21). Similar to the derivation of I_1 , I_2 can be obtained.

APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 4

In order to derive the conditional PDF of γ_{E_3} , we first give the PDF of the RV $Z_1 = P_B |\mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{B}\mathbf{E}}^\dagger \mathbf{w}_{\text{ZF}}|^2 / \sigma^2$ as [36]

$$f_{Z_1}(z) = \frac{z^{N_B-3} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 z}{P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}}}\right)}{(N_B-3)! (P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}} / \sigma^2)^{N_B-2}}, \quad N_B \geq 3. \quad (52)$$

Then, the conditional CDF of γ_{E_3} can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_{\gamma_{E_3}}(y|G_1) &= \int_0^\infty F_{X_E}(y(z+1)|G_1) f_{Z_1}(z) dz \\
 &= 1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right) \left(\frac{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}{P_Z \lambda_{\text{JE}} y + P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right)^{N_B-2}. \quad (53)
 \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the conditional PDF of γ_{E_3} can be obtained by taking a simple derivative.

APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 5

Following similar analysis of (45), the conditional secrecy outage probability of the SC/ZFB scheme is as in (54), shown at the bottom of the page.

where Ξ_1 and Ξ_2 can be derived with the help of [35, eq. (9.211.4)] as

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Xi_1 &= \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_s} - 1)}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right) \frac{\sigma^2}{P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}}} \\
 &\quad \times \Psi\left(1, 4 - N_B; \frac{\sigma^2 (n 2^{R_s} \lambda_{\text{AE}} + \lambda_{\text{AB}})}{P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right) \quad (55)
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Xi_2 &= \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_s} - 1)}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right) (N_B - 2) \\
 &\quad \times \Psi\left(1, 3 - N_B; \frac{\sigma^2 (n 2^{R_s} \lambda_{\text{AE}} + \lambda_{\text{AB}})}{P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right). \quad (56)
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the unconditional secrecy outage probability of the SC/ZFB scheme can be derived as

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/ZFB}}(R_s) &= \int_0^\infty \left[1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \cdot \Xi_1 \right. \\
 &\quad \left. - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \cdot \Xi_2 \right] f_{G_1}(g) dg. \quad (57)
 \end{aligned}$$

Finally, substituting the PDF of G_1 into (57) and performing some simple mathematical manipulations, the desired secrecy outage probability of the SC/ZFB scheme can be obtained.

APPENDIX F PROOF OF COROLLARY 1

When $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$, the conditional CDF of γ_{B_1} can be approximated as

$$F_{\gamma_{B_1}}(x|G_1) \approx \frac{1}{N_B!} \left(\frac{\sigma^2 x}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right)^{N_B}. \quad (58)$$

Also, the conditional PDF of γ_{E_1} can be written as

$$f_{\gamma_{E_1}}(y|G_1) = \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \exp\left(-\frac{y}{\bar{\gamma}_E}\right). \quad (59)$$

Substituting (58) and (59) into (14) and applying the binomial expansion, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the MRC scheme conditioned on the RV G_1 is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{MRC}}(R_s|G_1) &\approx \int_0^\infty F_{\gamma_{B_1}}(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1|G_1) f_{\gamma_{E_1}}(y|G_1) dy \\
 &= \frac{1}{N_B!} \left(\frac{\sigma^2 2^{R_s}}{P_{S_1} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right)^{N_B} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_s}-1}{2^{R_s}}\right)^{N_B-q} q! \bar{\gamma}_E^q. \quad (60)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/ZFB}}(R_s|G_1) &= \int_0^\infty F_{\gamma_{B_3}}(2^{R_s}(1+y)-1|G_1) f_{\gamma_{E_3}}(y|G_1) dy \\
 &= 1 - \underbrace{\sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right) \frac{\sigma^2 \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right)}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}} \left(\frac{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}{P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}} y + P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right)^{N_B-2} dy}_{\Xi_1} \\
 &\quad - \underbrace{\sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_s}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AB}}}\right) \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}}}\right) \frac{(N_B-2) P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}} (P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}})^{N_B-2}}{(P_B \lambda_{\text{JE}} y + P_{S_3} \lambda_{\text{AE}})^{N_B-1}} dy}_{\Xi_2}. \quad (54)
 \end{aligned}$$

Now, averaging over G_1 and with the help of equality [35, eq. (3.381.4)], the desired result can be derived.

APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2

When $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$, the conditional CDF of γ_{B_2} can be approximated as

$$F_{\gamma_{B_2}}(x|G_2) \approx \left(\frac{\sigma^2 x}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}} \right)^{N_B}. \quad (61)$$

In addition, the conditional PDF of γ_{E_2} can be rewritten as

$$f_{\gamma_{E_2}}(y|G_2) = \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} \frac{(-1)^{m-1} m \bar{\gamma}_E \bar{\gamma}_J}{(\bar{\gamma}_J y + m \bar{\gamma}_E)^2} \exp\left(-\frac{y}{\bar{\gamma}_E}\right) + \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J y + m \bar{\gamma}_E} \exp\left(-\frac{y}{\bar{\gamma}_E}\right). \quad (62)$$

Now, inserting (61) and (62) into (14) and applying the binomial expansion with the help of equality [35, eq. (9.211.4)], the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the SC/SJ scheme conditioned on the RV G_2 can be expressed as (63), shown at the bottom of the page.

Thus, the unconditional secrecy outage probability of the SC/SJ scheme is given by

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_S) \approx \int_0^\infty \left(\frac{\sigma^2 2^{R_S}}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}} \right)^{N_B} (\Theta_1 + \Theta_2) f_{G_2}(g) dg = \int_0^{Q/P_t} \left(\frac{2^{R_S}}{\bar{\gamma}_B} \right)^{N_B} (\Theta_1 + \Theta_2) f_{G_2}(g) dg + \int_{Q/P_t}^\infty \left(\frac{2^{R_S}}{\rho \bar{\gamma}_B} g \right)^{N_B} (\Theta_1 + \Theta_2) f_{G_2}(g) dg. \quad (64)$$

To this end, substituting the PDF of G_2 into (64) and utilizing the equality [35, eq. (3.381.4)], the desired result can be derived.

APPENDIX H
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5

Similar to (45), the secrecy outage probability of the SC/SJ scheme conditioned on G_2 can be expressed as equation (65), shown at the bottom of the page, where Θ_3 and Θ_4 can be derived, after some simple algebraic manipulations, as

$$\Theta_3 = \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_S}-1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \Psi\left(1, 0; \frac{m(\bar{\gamma}_B + n2^{R_S}\bar{\gamma}_E)}{\bar{\gamma}_B \bar{\gamma}_J}\right) \quad (66)$$

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_S|G_2) \approx \left(\frac{2^{R_S}}{\lambda_{AB} P_{S_2}/\sigma^2} \right)^{N_B} \times \underbrace{\sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_S}-1}{2^{R_S}} \right)^{N_B-q} \left(\frac{m \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^q \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, q; \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right)}_{\Theta_1} + \left(\frac{2^{R_S}}{\lambda_{AB} P_{S_2}/\sigma^2} \right)^{N_B} \underbrace{\sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \sum_{q=0}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{q} \left(\frac{2^{R_S}-1}{2^{R_S}} \right)^{N_B-q} \left(\frac{m \bar{\gamma}_E}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \right)^{q+1} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \Gamma(q+1) \Psi\left(q+1, q+1; \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J}\right)}_{\Theta_2}. \quad (63)$$

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\text{SC/SJ}}(R_S|G_2) = 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B-1} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \times \underbrace{\int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_S}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} P_B \lambda_{JE}}{(m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} + P_B \lambda_{JE} y)^2} \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE}}\right) dy}_{\Theta_3} - \sum_{n=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B}{n} (-1)^{n-1} \sum_{m=1}^{N_B} \binom{N_B-1}{m} (-1)^{m-1} \underbrace{\int_0^\infty \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 n (2^{R_S}(1+y)-1)}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AB}}\right) \frac{\sigma^2 m \exp\left(-\frac{\sigma^2 y}{P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE}}\right)}{m P_{S_2} \lambda_{AE} + P_B \lambda_{JE} y} dy}_{\Theta_4}. \quad (65)$$

$$\Theta_4 = \exp\left(-\frac{n(2^{R_s}-1)}{\bar{\gamma}_B}\right) \frac{m}{\bar{\gamma}_J} \Psi\left(1, 1; \frac{m(\bar{\gamma}_B + n2^{R_s}\bar{\gamma}_E)}{\bar{\gamma}_B\bar{\gamma}_J}\right). \quad (67)$$

Finally, substituting (66) and (67) into (65), we obtain the desired result.


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